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Abstract 
This study is a two pronged empirical study. First, it uncovers the extreme events’ risk of 
Norwegian equity market (Oslo Børs) in the form of Hill’s (1975) power law exponent. Second, 
it critically analyzes this time-varying tail risk (TVTR) estimator’s implications on the 
Norwegian stock market returns. This study is significantly imperative for equity investors 
owing to the high persistence level of this estimator. The estimator’s time series is highly 
persistent producing monthly AR (1) coefficient equal to 0.67. 
The empirical findings concludes that tail risk estimated using Hill’s (1975) power law 
exponent failed in forecasting Oslo benchmark index returns over the short as well as long 
horizon contrary to Jiang and Kelly (2014) empirical findings using the US market data. The 
cross-sectional analysis yielded mixed results. Cross-sectional analysis on equally weighted tail 
risk sensitive portfolios also yielded insignificant results however, the results are significant 
cross-sectionally – when tested for value weighted tail risk sensitive quintile portfolios – 
controlling for Fama-French three factors, Fama-French-Carhart four-factor momentum model, 
as well as with respect to the Fama-French-Carhart model plus the Bernt Arne Ødegaard’s Oslo 
stock exchange liquidity factor as a fifth control. The results suggest a long position in the 
highest TVTR sensitive value-weighted quintile portfolio and a short position in lowest TVTR 
sensitive value-weighted quintile portfolio yields annualized 26 percent Fama-French three 
factor alpha. This result has implications for asset pricing. This research will enrich the finance 
literature linked to the Norwegian equity market. This study also serves as basis for 
understanding the relation between continuously varying risk of Norwegian market and its 
repercussions on expected returns. 
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Chapter – 1 
1.1. Background  
An investment is a process of tying up money or other resources in the expectation of 
getting rewards in the future. These rewards correspond to the uncertainty of the future. A human 
being is assumed to be rational in his behavior, which means that one would avoid expected loss 
and inclined towards expected benefit. A rational investor invests if he anticipates that the future 
benefits justify both the time his money is tied up, and the exposure to future uncertainty. 
Investors have various investment options in the world. We can classify these options into two 
categories, real assets and financial assets. Real assets include developed or undeveloped real 
estate, crops, plants, and machinery whereas financial assets are claims on real assets. Examples 
of financial assets are stocks, bonds, treasury bills, certificate of deposits, and derivatives. 
Common stocks are the main concern in this thesis.  
Stocks or shares, in particular common stock, represent ownership in a corporation. 
Common stock holders are entitled to receive dividends that a firm may pay and are the residual 
claimants on the firm’s real assets. Not all companies pay dividends, and investors in such 
companies assumes the firm will grow more rapidly than the average firm, and thus will achieve 
a greater price gain than dividend paying firms.  “The greater the risk greater the reward” is an 
old adage that underlines the basic elements of finance, and means that an investor should be 
compensated for risk. Some risks are worth taking because of the yield they carry. Stockholders 
or equity holders’ benefit lie on two things first, the dividends they receive that the firm decides 
to pay and second, the increase in price of a share if that firm performs well. These benefits 
should be in accordance with both the time that their money is bound and the risk of the future. 
This benefit is the return of equity investors and the previously mentioned two factors constitute 
the risk of their investment. Risk of an investment usually is stated as the deviation from the 
expectation. 
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1.1.1. Risk and Return 
 The whole subject of finance permeates this paradigm of risk and return. Both, the risk 
and the return lie in the future, so a rational investor tries to balance the expected return against 
the expected risk and optimize his behavior. Risk is categorized into different types but can be 
summarized into two forms; the risk which is associated with the individual security and the risk 
which is associated with the market as a whole. In the case of individual risk, specific risk that 
affects the returns on that individual firm’s stock; for example, a strike by employees can affect 
expected profitability of that firm. Risk as variation from expectation does not mean the 
possibility of a bad outcome only; it also includes variation toward better than expected outcome. 
 Expected return on a stock is the sum that an investor anticipates to obtain after the 
completion of a specific time period. Both, Risk and return of a stock lie in the future so we 
cannot observe them but we can observe realized returns. Realized return on a share during a 
specific time period is equal to the dividend received during that period in addition to the relative 
difference between the price of that share in the end of that period and the price of that share in 
the beginning of that period. It can be computed as:  
   
           
    
                                                        
    Realized return on a share 
Pt = Price of the share in the end of the period 
Pt-1 = Price of the share in the beginning of the period 
Dt = Dividend received during the period 
Expected returns lie in the future, which is uncertain but one can estimate it using  
assumptions and beliefs about the future outcome of the firm and associated different 
probabilities for each state of the firm’s performance for example the firm will perform 
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excellent, good, below average and poorly. In this case, the expected return on a firm’s stock in a 
specific time period, say one year, is equal to the probability-weighted average of the rates of 
return in each state. 
      ∑                                                                       
       Expected return on a firm’s stock in the next year 
      = Probability of each state of the firm’s performance in the next year 
     = Assumed rates of return given performance of the firm in the next year 
  
The risk is a variation from the 
expectation or expected mean (µ), 
thus standard deviation (σ) and 
variance (σ2) are good measures of 
risk presumed normality (see Figure 
1.1). Actual returns are most often not 
equal to µ, but either larger or lower. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The 
upside risk is the chance that the 
actual returns may lie after µ and the 
chance that actual returns may lie 
before µ is viewed as downside risk. 
If returns are normally distributed, standard deviation can be a good measure of risk. Assets 
which are free from any kind of risk are called risk-free return, such as US treasury bills (3 
months). The US T-bill is considered risk-free due to the fact that the US government has never 
defaulted on its debt and issues debt in its own currency. The power to tax US residents can raise 
money to pay the borrowed amount against T-bills, thus they are free from default or credit risk. 
They are short term assets so with no or insignificant interest rate risk, inflation risk, and 
Figure 1.1 - Normal distribution showing mean and standard deviation 
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maturity risk. A risky investment opportunity must have higher expected return to attract risk 
aversive investors. This excess return over risk free asset is the compensation for risk taken by 
investors and is called risk premium. 
              (  )                                                           
       Expected Risk Premium on Individual Asset 
       Expected Return on Individual Asset 
       Expected Risk Free Rate  
The risk can be categorized into two groups, individual risk and market risk. Individual 
risk is the exposure to the uncertainty of returns of that individual asset. As per basic assumption 
of economic rationality investors are risk averse and they try to avoid risks and 
contemporaneously seek for higher returns. Individual risk is also characterized as avoidable risk 
whereas market risk is said to be unavoidable. Optimum financial behavior is pursuing an 
investing alternative with the least expected risk against the highest realizable expected return 
under given constraints. Investors use diversification as a tool to reduce individual or 
idiosyncratic risk. Diversification is investing in a variety of assets so that the negative 
performance of one individual firm cannot affect one’s overall investment with same intensity. 
Thus in a portfolio with a variety of assets, one asset’s negative shock is compensated by other 
asset’s positive shock. 
  A portfolio of risky assets, and in particular risky assets portfolio optimization, is a long 
debated topic in finance. In his seminal paper, Nobel laureate Harry Markowitz, Markowitz 
(1952), characterized risk as the variance of the portfolio. Markowitz argued that investors are 
mean – variance optimizers. He showed that a combination of assets which are negatively 
correlated leads to lesser risk, variance, than the stand alone risk of both assets.  In his theory, he 
summarized the risk-return opportunities which are available to any investors in a minimum 
frontier, which is widely known as efficient frontier curve. William Sharpe (1964) shows a 
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natural relationship between expected return and variance by a model known as Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) based on implications of Markowitz portfolio optimization theory.  
1.1.2. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
CAPM suggests that if all investors use the same input list, which Markowitz (1952) laid 
down, to find optimum risky portfolio given identical investible universe, they will end up 
choosing value weighted market portfolio. CAPM claims that the risk of an individual asset is 
determined by the contribution of that asset in the variance of market portfolio and Sharpe 
denoted risk as Beta (β). 
Beta (β) = 
                                    
                           
    (1.4) 
CAPM was a breakthrough in finance as it provides estimated risk premium which an 
investor should require given the risk of the asset. This model served a key role in evaluating 
possible investments by providing benchmark expected rate of return. This model also helped 
professionals in pricing stocks which are not yet traded in the market. The model use individual 
asset contribution of risk to overall market to reach that asset’s expected return. That was the 
time when the idea of predicting stock returns using risk factors was conceived. Risk factor 
calculation was done using advanced mathematics, see equation 1.4.  The CAPM can be written 
as: 
                                  (1.5) 
       Expected Return on Individual Asset 
    Risk Free Rate 
       Expected Return on Market Portfolio 
William Sharpe was also awarded the Nobel Prize for his contribution in the field of 
economics and finance. Afterwards researchers have introduced some extensions to CAPM, for 
example Merton (1973) formulated the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) 
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where the investor is allowed to hedge against a shortfall in consumption, and Breeden’s (1979) 
Consumption Based CAPM (CCAPM). The CCAPM factors in consumption as a means of 
understanding and calculating an expected return on investment. Merton (1973) suggested that 
there are a number of risk factors that affect stock returns such as uncertainty in income and 
price of key consumer goods (inflation risk). He relaxed the CAPM one period assumption and 
viewed investors as lifetime wealth optimizers; they try to optimize between current wealth and 
retirement wealth. However, Breeden (1979) characterized risk (β) as the covariance between 
asset returns and consumption growth. In his model, individual asset risk factor is attributed to 
the contribution of it towards consumption tracking portfolio whereas in Sharpe’s CAPM its 
market portfolio. He defined consumption tracking portfolio as the portfolio with highest 
correlation with consumption growth. A more recent development is the X-CAPM, derived by 
Barberis et al. (2015). In the X-CAPM, some investors form beliefs about future returns by 
extrapolating past returns, which generate some heterogeneity in the financial market. The X-
CAPM captures many features of prices and returns of stocks, as well as being consistent with 
survey data on investor expectations. 
1.2. Introduction 
CAPM’s prediction of expected return was based on constant variance of historical mean 
and constant covariances among different assets’ returns. But with the passage of time and 
ongoing research it is apparent that volatilities of returns keep on varying which means that there 
are some time periods of low volatility as well as there are some time periods of high volatility. 
Therefore models that encompass this time-varying nature of returns’ volatility provide more 
realistic measure of risk than those which are based on constant volatility assumption. This time-
varying behavior of returns’ volatility is also termed as heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity 
means that volatility of an asset or whole market tend cluster, high volatility period followed by 
a high volatility and low volatility period followed by low volatility. 
Merton (1980) described that market return variance change over time so estimators 
based on time series of realized return data should be adjusted for heteroskedasticity. He also 
suggested of using non market data for forecasting expected return such as the surveys of 
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Figure-1.2a – Skewed Returns Distribution Figure-1.2b – Fat-Tailed Returns Distribution 
investor holdings, corporate earnings and other accounting data. It is the expected volatility that 
is of concern, and it is time-varying. Standard deviation is a good estimator of risk implied that 
the distribution is normal. However, extreme values are more common in economic data than 
that of natural data (Mandelbrot 1963), which can affect the foundation standard asset pricing 
models. Shiller (2003) validated fatter tailed returns data empirically of the annual rate of return 
of American stock market from 1871 till 2002. All the before mentioned studies found that 
returns are not normally distributed. Figures 1.2a and 1.2b shows the hypothetical distributions 
which assets returns can take. 
 
Predicting the equity premium is of great interest for professionals and academia, thus 
literature provides a long list of predictors of excess returns. Examples include, but not limited 
to, CAPM (Sharpe 1964; Linter 1965; Black 1972), dividend-price ratio (Fama and French 
1988), earnings-price ratio (Campbell and Shiller 1988), nominal interest rates (Fama and 
Schwert 1977; Campbell 1987), book-market value ratio (Kothari and Shanken 1997), the 
inflation rate (Nelson 1976; Fama and Schwert 1977), term and default spreads (Campbell 1987; 
Fama and French 1989), corporate issuing activity (Baker and Wurgler 2000; Boudoukh et al. 
2007), consumption-wealth ratio (Lettau and Ludvigson 2001), and stock market volatility (Guo 
2006). Goyal and Welch (2008) discussed various predictors of US stock market excess return 
and tested a long list of predictors from the literature and concluded that some predictors perform 
good in-sample but when it comes to out-of-sample equity premium prediction, almost all of 
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them is found to be inconsistent with empirical data relative to historical average. In sample 
predictability proclaims estimating the model using data of a specific time period and then 
comparing the model fitted values to the actual realization during that specific time period, 
whereas out of sample means comparing the model fitted values to the actual observed values 
after that particular time period.   
Almost all models in finance corroborate the relation between expected risk and expected 
return. There are many reasons for calculating these expectations, i.e. the estimation of expected 
excess return, avoiding risks which are not worth taking, for fairly pricing of assets and options 
etc. Investors and academia used variance, in particular square root of variance, as a measure of 
risk. Robert C. Merton (1980) identified many errors in estimation models of expected risk based 
on realized returns as well as put light on the noisiness of models which were being used for 
estimating expected return directly from time series of realized returns. Historically, expected 
volatility was estimated by a measure of standard deviation of observed returns over a specified 
period. Selecting a correct time period remained the question as too long horizon sample would 
be irrelevant for future volatility and too short sample would result in noisy estimate. This is 
important because volatility changes over time. The literature on time-varying volatility is large 
and expanding every year (see for example Franses and McAleer 2002). 
 Equity risk premium (ERP) prediction has evolved over the period of time whereby 
single variables as well as combination of variables have been used to predict returns. Goyal and 
Welch (2008) tested a handful of prediction variables and concluded that they all perform bad 
out-of-sample which triggers prompt opposing responses from econometrics scholars (Spiegel 
2008). Kelly and Jiang (2014) proposed an asymptotic measure of time-varying tail risk (TVTR) 
for predicting aggregate market returns which is directly estimable from cross-section of returns. 
They argued that the measure is significantly correlated with the tail risk measures calculated 
from the S&P-500 index. They showed that one standard deviation increase in tail risk forecasts 
an increase in excess market returns of 4.5% over the following year. They showed that their 
variable is valid in-sample as well as out-of-sample and predicts ERP positively and this measure 
has a negative relation with overall economic activity. They compared it empirically with all the 
variables tested by Goyal and Welch (2008) and showed that their measure achieved better t-
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statistic and R-Square value. They also showed that, cross-sectionally, stocks with high loadings 
on past tail risk earn an annual three-factor (FF+Mom+Liq) alpha 5.4% higher than stocks with 
low tail risk loadings.  
1.3. Problem Statement 
 There are plenty of published papers discussing categorically different variables for 
estimating ERP includes economic, financial, accounting and estimated variables, see, for 
example, Fama and French (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1989) 
Kothari and Shanken (1997), Baker and Wurgler (2000), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Guo 
(2006) and Goyal and Welch (2008). Diebold and Mariano (1995) argued that if the predictor is 
not an asymptotically estimated variable then predictive regressions may provide a valid forecast 
for expected return but not otherwise. On the contrary, Torous et al. (2004) stated that the 
regression of stock returns on lagged financial variables – dividend yield, book to market ratio 
and default spread – has low power due to the noisiness of stock market returns and hence 
provide erroneous forecasts. Lanne (2002) also said that, on long-horizon, returns cannot be 
predicted with a highly persistent variable; financial ratios as they tend to correlate with the 
dependent variable. These opposing views create ambiguity about which view to follow as either 
estimated asymptotic variables such as variance, standard deviation, volatility, correlation, 
skewness, tail risk, value at risk, and kurtosis, predictability is more accurate than the variables 
extracted from actual data such as dividend payout ratio, book to market value ratio, earnings 
price ratio, dividend price ratio. These contradictory views of different scholars has made it 
difficult to choose a prediction variable that delivers superior forecasts but almost all prediction 
models are based on CAPM logic that premium would be higher on more risky assets and these 
models demand empirical standing for validity. Goyal and Welch (2008) did a comprehensive 
empirical study on these predictors using US market data to check how valid these variables are 
in predicting ERP using predictive regressions in sample and out of sample. They concluded that 
all these variables perform relatively worse than the historical average.  
 Volatility has been used as predicting returns which changes with time. After the 
subprime global crisis it became evident that volatilities are higher than estimated by value at 
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risk (VaR) method. This added fuel to the fire as the European sovereign debt crisis posed a dire 
need to revisit the measure of tail risks, which were previously based on VaR, due to the notion 
that VaR is based of assumption of normality (Allen et al. 2013). Kelly and Jiang (2014) 
presented a new measure of time varying tail risk and showed empirically using US market data 
from 1963 to 2010 that their measure is correlated with other tail risk measure calculated from 
S&P500 and predicts returns better than the variables studied by Goyal and Welch (2008). Their 
study results are striking as higher t-statistic in sample and their measure showed a positive 
though little R-square value in out-of-sample predictability. This is a new measure and has no 
literature in context of Norwegian stock market. It is not necessary that all stock markets show 
same behavior so my contribution would be to investigate this estimator empirically in the 
Norwegian market context. The research is conducted based on data from the database TITLON, 
which contains information of the companies listed on Oslo Stock Exchange alias Oslo Børs. 
The main questions to be answered by this research work
1
 are: 
1- What is the tail risk of Norwegian equity market given the time-varying tail risk, TVTR, 
measure? 
2- Does the TVTR measure explain the Norwegian aggregate market returns – Return on 
Oslo Benchmark Index? 
3- Cross-sectionally, what is the empirical standing of TVTR?  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 All the analyses performed using Microsoft SQL Server, Microsoft Excel and R. 
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Chapter – 2 
2.1. Literature Framework 
 Risk is basically the likelihood of deviation from expected return or mean. Unlike price 
variations, expectation is a latent variable so we cannot observe it. If the variance had been 
constant over time, then standard deviation of observed returns would have been the perfect 
estimate of risk and the volatility could have been be an observable phenomenon. But 
unfortunately, variance changes over time and equity return’s distributions significantly deviate 
from normality (Mandelbrot 1963). These deviations from normality can be detected using 
higher moments of returns distribution. The third moment, which is the ratio of average cubed-
deviations from average to cubed-standard deviation, is used to detect asymmetry in distribution 
called Skewness (Figure1.2a show a depiction of positive and negative Skewness). The fourth 
moment, which measures the degree of fat tails, is called Kurtosis. It is the ratio of deviations 
raised to power four to fourth power of standard deviation. A normal distribution has zero value 
of Skewness and the Kurtosis value of three. A negative Skewness implies that more mass of the 
returns probability is in the left side of the distribution. There are more extreme negative events 
expected to happen than positive extreme events and vice versa for positive Skewness. Kurtosis 
represents fewer values around the mean. 
Alexander (2001) stated that volatility and correlations cannot be measured directly from 
market data, therefore we need econometric models to estimate them. An econometric model is 
an application of statistical methods to critically asses the hypothetical relationship between 
economic data. The improvement in these models went side by side in devising different 
techniques for forecasting excess return and other financial outcomes. Which parameter is a 
correct estimate of risk? This question is still in the exploration phase. Markowitz (1959) argued 
that semi-variance is a proper estimate of risk because variance penalized both upside and 
downside risk. Sharpe (1964) in his CAPM embodied risk as beta (β) which does not change 
with the high and low volatility periods. Lindenberg (1977) suggested two variations of beta, 
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downside and upside beta, to discern the asymmetric behavior of risk (Ang et al. 2006). 
Volatility, the degree of variation in the price of a security, is also used as a measure of risk. 
There are many features of financial time series data volatility as of now; fat-tailed distributions, 
volatility clustering, asymmetry and volatilities comovements between assets and financial 
markets (Granger and Poon 2003). 
Priestley (2001) argued that stock prices are very volatile and highly responsive to news 
about future outlook of firms. He stated that persistence exists in expected returns and the time-
varying nature of expected returns is a function of time-varying volatilities. Many empirical 
studies found that extreme returns in lagged period entails extreme returns in the next period. 
Engle (1982) introduced an econometric model for dynamic volatility named Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity commonly known as ARCH. ARCH model assumes that returns 
volatility is clustered; high and low volatility tend to persist thus expected variance is a function 
of equally weighted average of the squared residuals from last n days;  
            
           
                                                  
   = Estimate of expected volatility 
 i = Order of ARCH process  
   = Square of residuals  whereas   (             ). 
But as a general understanding recent events would be given more weightage than that of 
older events. This weightage problem of ARCH resolved as Bollerslev (1986) developed 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity Model known as GARCH. In this 
model the weights are assumed to decline geometrically on older residuals. Afterwards there 
have been many extensions in ARCH i.e. GARCH, IGARCH, Component ARCH, Asymmetric 
component ARCH, GED-ARCH see Eagle (2004). 
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 Investors have to face risk and return trade-off every time when deciding about 
investment. The event of subprime crisis left risk observers, analysts, and managers wondering 
about risk measures. There comes a dire need to find adequate and realistic risk measures as 
insufficient risk analysis of risk results in mispricing of assets and more severely underestimation 
of risk (Mitra 2009).  The fall of international financial institutions suddenly created an 
extremely tremulous situation in money markets as well as in stock markets, liquidity of the 
markets was evaporated, stock prices turned unstable and volatilities and risk were sky-rocked. 
(Degiannakis et. al 2012)  
Financial behavior is fundamentally influenced by risk factors. Angelidis and 
Degiannakis (2009) described five risk factors in their writing which include business, credit, 
market, liquidity and operational risk. Business risk is attributed to a specific industry in which a 
firm operates. Credit risk is the likelihood of a firm being unable to meet its liabilities. Liquidity 
risk comes into play when an investor is unable to sell a security without a significant change in 
the price of the security. Operational risks are which arise due to internal systems of a firm. 
Market risk is the unforeseen behavior of asset prices as a whole, is also often attributed to 
volatility and value at risk (VaR) is a good measure of market risk.  
If we consider volatility as the risk then the fundamental principle of finance that higher 
risk is traded off with higher return does not seem fulfilling. Baker et al. (2011) explained these 
inconsistencies that low volatile stocks are better off than high volatility stocks. It means that 
investors are not being rewarded for taking additional risk, contradicting standard financial 
theory such as the CAPM. They concluded that when an asset’s volatility is high institutional 
investors, such as mutual funds, are fiercely after these assets to secure higher returns than the 
index S&P500 thus decreasing their expected returns. Hsu et al. (2013) claimed that financial 
analysts exaggerate forecasts for high volatile stocks that trigger high demand for these stocks 
among investors. They assumed that most of the investors over-react to analysts’ high forecasts 
which lead to systematic overpricing of high volatility stocks thus lower returns for high 
volatility assets.  
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Figure-2.1 – Returns Distribution with Higher Probability of Extreme Negative Events 
Ibbotson et al. (2014) answered these low volatility puzzle differently. They asked a more 
fundamental question: which one is rewarded – tail risk or volatility? Tails are referred to the end 
portions of the bell-shaped distribution curves, see figure-2.1. These curves show the statistical 
probabilities of possible outcomes, the left tail represent extreme negative outcomes and the right 
tail represent extreme positive items. They explained that volatility and beta are the risk 
estimators that penalized assets of non-normal behavior, either its left tail or the right tail, so 
these both so not seem good estimators of risk. They claimed that all investors unambiguously 
see left tail values as bad outcomes consequently they should be rewarded for taking high tail 
risks in particularly left tail risk.  
The market does not behave normally as evident from various crises; stock market crash 
1929, black-monday 1987, asia crisis 1997, dot com bubble crash 2000 and subprime and 
banking crisis 2008 (Ibbotson et al. 2014). Investors require a premium to invest in negatively 
skewed or left fat-tailed stocks. The definition of risk aversive investor would be “One who 
seeks to minimize the left tail risk of returns without inhibiting the right tail growth potential”. 
Ibbotson et al. (2014) termed the premium as tail-risk premium and argued that tail risk premium 
is economically significant in US stocks. They used standard deviation for volatility and two 
variables – Skewness and an extension of VaR – for calculating tail risk. Figure 2.1 shows 
distribution with high tail risks, red color shows the probability of extreme negative returns while 
green color shows the probability of extreme gains. 
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The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 was the main event that put many professionals 
and academic researchers to look for better and realistic measures of tail risk. Since then, tail risk 
has been a heavily discussed topic among academic researchers due to the fact that returns often 
violate the assumption normal distribution (Ibbotson et al. 2014). The tail risk discussion started 
very early when Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1963) studied the behavior of returns and 
concluded that prices in markets can take an unforeseen course which cannot be expected from 
Gaussian (normal) distribution. Akgiray and Booth (1988) and Jansen and de Vries (1991) 
further the work and deduced that the behavior of returns under the tails is fundamentally 
different from residual distribution. Sortino and Price (1994) argued that downside deviation 
should be used as a risk measure as it represents left tail risk.  
Since JP Morgan introduced its matrices based risk measure VaR, VaR has been used as 
a benchmark by financial sector to manage their risk. Since VaR does not account for the whole 
distribution, it was believed to be the logical tail risk estimator (Xu 2014). Rockafellar and 
Uryasev (2000) proposed a new measure of tail risk, Expected Shortfall, based on VaR, though 
coherent. It is also termed as conditional value at risk (CVaR) and conditional tail expectation 
(CTE) (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000; Bodie et al. 2004). Researchers were thriving for 
improved tail risk measures and resorted to using quantitative theories in parameterizing tail risk.  
Bali (2003) introduced extreme value theory (EVT) in the measurement of tail risk. EVT 
is a statistical theory which deals with the extreme deviations from median in a probability 
distribution. Ze-To (2012) stated that EVT method parameterizing of extreme tail distributions 
entails the extension of the probability curve beyond the range of data. He proclaimed that using 
EVT in estimating VaR gives a better estimate of extreme values. He advanced to reaffirm the 
findings of Bali and Neftci (2003), they derived VaR using EVT and claimed that their model 
accurately forecasts the occurrence and size of extreme observations. Marimoutou et al. (2009) 
implemented EVT theory in estimating tail risk in energy markets and claimed that EVT models 
provide better estimates of tail risk than that of GARCH model. It is evident from literature that 
returns are dependent on tail risk and the tail risk premium is economically significant. 
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Agarwal and Naik (2004) stated that financial securities are associated with different 
kinds of risk and each risk factor provides its associated risk premium. There is no single 
investment strategy that entails entire risk factors. So, for investors who want to get higher 
returns associated with different risk factors must engage in different investment strategies. 
Mutual funds employ strategies that account for equity, interest rate and default risk such as buy-
and-hold strategy. However, Hedge funds follow dynamic trading strategies to capture risk 
premia associated with dynamic factors such as bid-ask spread. Their target is to beat the passive 
benchmark. They offer exposure to such risk factors that other investment funds such as mutual 
funds cannot offer. They expose investments to higher left tail risks and the risk-return relation is 
nonlinear in their case. They bear significant left tail risks which are severely understated under 
mean-variance framework; CVaR seems to a better performing estimator for those extreme risks 
(Agarwal and Naik 2004). 
According to Bodie et al. (2004), it is evident that the frequency of negative extreme 
returns is not what is represented by a normal distribution, as the distribution is skewed and often 
has kurtosis – fat tails. They proposed four measures to cater for the vulnerability of extreme 
negative events. These are value at risk, expected shortfall, lower partial standard deviation, and 
the frequency of extreme returns – 3-sigma. The first two are explained in this document.  
2.1.1 Returns Predictability & Market Efficiency 
 Market efficiency refers to the concept that prices of individual stocks as well as indexes 
reflect all available information. The market efficiency hypothesis was formulated by Nobel 
Memorial Prize holder in economics, Eugene Fama, in 1970. This hypothesis explains the returns 
predictability phenomena. It states the equity prices fully reflect information available in the 
market and no one can take advantage of stock price prediction because no one has access to 
information which is not already available to everyone. The information does not have to be a 
financial news or financial analysis; it can be political, legal, law and order, social or warfare. 
The information does not have to be true, it may be rumored information. Thus efficient market 
hypothesis claims that no one can consistently beat the market meaning that one cannot gain 
higher returns by predicting stock prices repeatedly (Fama 1970). 
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 According to efficient market hypothesis (EMH) stock prices follow Random Walk. 
Random Walk in this context refers to the idea that in a stock price series each successive price 
change represents a random departure from previous price. The idea asserts that if flow of 
information is not hampered and information is immediately reflected in equity prices, then 
today’s stock price movement is a reflection of today’s news and this movement is independent 
of last day price. By definition, news cannot be predicted as a consequence stock price 
movements are purely random and unpredictable. EMH proponents advocate the idea that 
strategies that aim to outperform the market consistently will fail and passive investors will be 
better-off. There is also transaction cost involved in deploying active beat-the-market strategy 
which strengthens the EMH school of thought that investment in index fund is more profitable 
(Heakal 2013). 
  Fama (1970) also explained three states of market efficiency according to their degree of 
intensity; weak efficiency, semi-strong efficiency and strong efficiency. Weak efficiency 
suggests stock prices reflect all historical market data such as past prices, sale volumes and 
dividends. Semi-strong efficiency refers to stock prices being a reflection of past market data as 
well as current publicly available information such as financial statements. In strong market 
efficiency state, stock prices reflect past market data, publicly available information and private 
information such as insider information. EMH stands for non-predictability of returns in all three 
states. Statisticians, however, found that returns series show persistence which made the basis for 
returns predictability argument. Stock returns are partially predictable and empirical studies 
showed statistically significant predictability evidences (Schwert 2003). He also stated that most 
of the prediction patterns seem to disappear after being published in finance literature. 
 Heakal (2013) stated that in the real world there is evidence of market inefficiency since 
there are investors who have outperformed the market and made billion such as Warren Buffet. 
Such investors’ investment strategy revolves around finding undervalued stocks and making 
money out of it. He also explained that EMH does not mean that stock prices remain equal to 
their fair value all the time. EMH suggests that investors, who have beaten market, were just 
lucky means they did not do it out of skill. Heakal (2013) concluded that although the 
18 | P a g e  
 
advancement in information technology has made markets more efficient but they cannot be 
absolutely efficient or fully inefficient hence a mixture of both. 
 Kelly and Jiang (2014) remained silent over EMH. However, they claimed that their 
TVTR measure, which is calculated using Hill’s (1975) power law, has strong return’s prediction 
power due to its persistence. This statement is implicitly in opposition to EMH of returns’ non-
predictability. They also claimed that TVTR has asset pricing implications. Assets with high 
loadings of left tail risk remain deterred to investors due to high vested risk. This deterrence 
makes these assets undervalued therefore they become good contenders for above average 
expected return.  
The aforementioned argument relies on the basic economics’ “General Equilibrium 
Theory” of demand and supply. However if markets are efficient TVTR predictability will 
disappear. According to EMH investors must sense that the markets are inefficient so investment 
strategies will be focused on outperforming the market. Ironically, these beat-the-market 
strategies serve as the impetus that keeps a market efficient.  
It is my conjecture that market efficiency hypothesis is moderately in line with economics’ 
general equilibrium theory of demand and supply, because as the prediction pattern becomes 
available to professionals in market. They will try to beat the market, this action will in-turn 
increase the demand for that particular asset with above average expected return. Therefore price 
of that asset will increase and the above average expected return will disappear. But it does not 
mean that there are no ways to beat the market. Investor, who found the pattern first and 
exercised it, will be better-off than other pattern followers. 
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2.1.2 Value at Risk 
The value at risk is the loss which is associated to a left tail of the return distribution. It is 
actually the value linked to a very low percentile of the return distribution such as 1%, or 5%. 
VaR is the most commonly used estimation technique for left tail risk especially among financial 
sector. If p is the percentile of a distribution, p% of possible values lie below it for example 5 
percentile means that 5 percent of realized value will be expected to be below that mark. Five 
percent VaR is commonly used among professionals; meaning that 95 percent value of return 
will be above VaR value and 5 percent will be below (Bodie et al. 2004). Gilli and Këllezi 
(2006) defined VaR as “the capital sufficient to cover, in most instances, losses from a portfolio 
over a holding period of a fixed number of days.” 
Xu (2014) stated that VaR serves as a benchmark in financial sector in managing risk. He 
further explained the concept as it is the maximum possible loss a risky portfolio holder can 
expect over a period of time. The common use of VaR is in banking sector as Banks use this 
measure to calculate capital requirements. VaR under the assumption of normality with zero 
mean unity standard deviation: 
VaR (.05, Normal) = Mean – 1.65 SD     (2.2) 
 Gregory and Reeves (2008) stated that VaR calculating methods are based on the 
assumptions, time-invariant distribution of portfolio returns and constant security holdings. 
These assumptions are not realistic due to the notion that distributions of the asset returns are 
time-varying and the active trading strategies results in unexpected changes in portfolio size. 
They put light on the two estimation methods – Historical Simulation and Variance-Covariance – 
and explained the latter method’s underlying normality approach which is not supported by 
empirical returns data whereas historical simulation will always be having “Black Swan” 
problem. They hunch that VaR forecasts would fail as the left tail mass is not actually 
represented by the confidence interval.  
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Angelidis and Degiannakis (2009) explained various criticisms of the VaR, such as 
different VaR estimation techniques present different results, thus it is imprecise. The risk 
estimates are not sub-additive therefore no coherence in the parameter. Bodie et al. (2004) stated 
that it is an optimistic measure of left tail risk due to the fact that it takes into account the highest 
worst case scenario value. Moreover VaR estimate is very difficult to use by investors in 
optimizing their portfolios, see, for example, Yamai and Yoshiba (2005). VaR is usually reported 
in a positive number say 5%VaR of 1 million dollars means that there is a 95% chance that the 
portfolio return over the next specified time will be greater than 1 million dollars (Crouhy et al. 
2014). As if now, there have been many improved extensions of VaR to resolve the criticized 
issues, see for example Pearson and Smithson (2002). 
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2.1.3 Expected Shortfall 
 Artzner et al. (1999) presented expected shortfall (ES) as a new measure of risk and 
criticize VaR being non-coherent. This measure has been given many names by different 
scholars such as Conditional Value at Risk – CVaR (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000), Conditional 
Tail Expectation – CTE (Bodie et al. 2004) and Tail VaR (Gourieroux & Jasiak 2011). This 
measure holds the aspects of VaR methodology as well as focus more on the distribution of 
returns in the tail. In simple words ES is the expected value of the left tail distribution. As being 
the mean of the left tail, ES value is always greater than VaR in absolute sense thus it does not 
depict as optimistic view of risk as predicted by traditional VaR. Figure-2.2 showing values of 
VaR and ES. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
As its clear from the figure-2.2 that ES is more reliable parameter of risk especially in 
market turmoil conditions and it does not discourage diversification though VaR occasionally 
does (Angelidis and Degiannakis 2009). ES estimates can be postulated using ARCH/GARCH 
volatility process or using extreme value theory (Xu 2014). 
 
Figure-2.2: Difference between values of ES and VaR 
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2.1.4 Time Varying Tail Risk (TVTR) 
 It is apparent from empirical studies that the distribution of returns is time-varying 
and has more probability mass in the left tail, therefore tail risk is a contender for economically 
significant premium. Kelly and Jiang (2014) proposed a new measure of time-varying extreme 
events’ risk. They claimed that a dynamic univariate tail risk parameter which is calculated from 
a time series of market returns using GARCH model is infeasible due to the less frequent 
extreme events. They resorted to individual firm tail events to estimate the overall tail risk 
measure under the assumption that firm level tail distributions embody similar dynamics. They 
took refuge in advanced mathematics (Power Law) to calculate extreme return events of 
individual firms. Their assumption is validated due to the highly correlated TVTR estimates of 
different industries ranging from 57% to 87%. When calculated on individual stocks, TVTR 
shows highly persistent results with first degree autoregressive coefficient AR(1) equals 0.927 – 
AR(1) value close to one represent high persistence –  which means that it has high predictive 
power. TVTR also have significant prediction power for aggregate stock returns, and can serve 
as a variable in explaining asset price behavior. The predicting power of TVTR outperforms 
other common predictors of equity returns such as dividend price ratio and various other 
variables tested by Goyal and Welch (2008). They claim that this measure can be used in any 
setting where large cross-section is available. The focus of my master thesis is on the TVTR 
measure and its implications in the Norwegian stock market. TVTR is calculated using hill’s 
power law using equation (3.1): 
 
  
     
 
  
∑   
    
  
 
   
                                                            
 
  
      Tail Risk Component 
    Tail Threshold  
      The kth daily return that falls below an extreme value threshold 
    The total number of exceedences over threshold within a month 
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Chapter – 3 
3.1  Dataset Creation 
 This section presents the sources of data used for the computation of TVTR and 
performing related analysis. The risk estimator TVTR depends on the cross-section of returns, so 
I needed a large panel of stocks to gather sufficient information about the tail events at each 
point in time. Norwegian stocks data is obtained from the TITLON
2
 database, which contains 
Norwegian market (Oslo Børs) data from 1983. The database contains Norwegian data of 
equities, mutual funds, indices, bonds and derivatives. The database contains variety of variables 
such as unadjusted, fully adjusted prices, logarithmic risk free rate, logarithmic returns and many 
more. I used the dataset from January 1990 till December 2015 for calculating TVTR and for 
testing the estimator performance in explaining returns on Oslo Benchmark Index
3
 (OSEBX). 
 The dataset consists of 1,369,396 daily records of 800 unique securities and 672 unique 
companies
4
. I needed only common stocks’ records to compute TVTR as per the original model 
specified by Jiang & Kelly (2014) and to mitigate dependence among returns on categorically 
different stocks of the same company. The TITLON database has a variable called Description
5
 
which clarifies the type of stock issued by each company. I dwindled the dataset by 204,608 
records through choosing record of stocks with Description title “A-aksjer”, ”Ordinære aksjer” 
and “Konverterte A”. This elimination left me with 1,164,788 daily records of 661 unique 
securities. Dataset for returns on OSEBX was also gathered from the TITLON database. 
                                                 
2
 TITLON is a database with financial data from Oslo Stock Exchange for all universities and university colleges in 
Norway. It contains detailed daily financial data with fully adjusted prices. - See more at: 
https://uit.no/forskning/forskningsgrupper/sub?p_document_id=352767&sub_id=417205#sthash.TyM0wwCM.dpuf  
3
 Linked benchmark Index of OSEBX used with the security id 2 
4
 Unique companies and unique securities are identified by the company id and security id respectively 
5
 A full list of stock types (Description) is available in the Table A1 in appendix (Norwegian language) 
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Monthly returns on OSEBX were calculated by summing up daily logarithmic returns from 
TITLON owing to the additive consistency property of logarithmic returns.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Common Stocks Listed on OSE Oslo Benchmark Index 
Year No. of Stocks Mean Return Standard Deviation Mean Return Standard Deviation 
1990 135 -1.61 58.92 -1.20 24.59 
1991 122 -2.89 71.48 -0.82 25.80 
1992 123 -4.84 78.62 -0.88 27.73 
1993 138 5.83 66.70 4.16 19.77 
1994 144 0.07 40.45 0.57 19.81 
1995 159 1.68 37.65 0.91 12.55 
1996 172 2.69 43.09 1.56 15.07 
1997 214 1.02 43.31 2.33 13.48 
1998 231 -4.77 55.19 -2.62 36.15 
1999 228 2.87 58.99 3.29 17.35 
2000 226 -1.02 60.14 0.26 15.65 
2001 210 -3.28 69.64 -1.32 24.86 
2002 196 -6.28 79.94 -3.10 26.76 
2003 190 3.67 72.63 3.29 23.56 
2004 183 2.25 48.06 2.71 17.02 
2005 217 3.10 49.56 2.83 17.96 
2006 238 2.09 38.08 2.34 15.58 
2007 272 0.06 53.87 0.90 13.36 
2008 266 -9.18 77.03 -6.48 47.08 
2009 247 2.14 82.51 4.16 19.58 
2010 238 0.29 61.46 1.40 22.81 
2011 231 -3.69 60.25 -1.11 17.84 
2012 221 -0.22 58.13 1.19 14.90 
2013 220 1.11 62.51 1.77 9.98 
2014 216 -1.70 49.72 0.40 9.50 
2015 208 -1.77 61.86 0.48 12.46 
Table 1 - It includes the number of common stocks listed on OSE during the year, monthly average of log returns on all 
common stocks and their respective annualized standard deviation. The right side of the table presents the average 
monthly log return on OSEBX and its respective annualized standard deviation. Return and standard deviation figures 
are percentages. 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the data fetched from TITLON to test the 
hypothesis that TVTR is a sound measure of risk and it could explain positive returns in the 
forthcoming period. The occurrence of negative returns is visible just by a glimpse of the table 
above. Both losers and gainers are in the sample but losers are more intensely negative in 
converse to the gainers positive impact yielding the monthly mean returns of all common stocks 
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to -0.48 percent. The amounting figures of standard deviation show evidently that the spectrum 
of monthly returns is very wide. Listed number of common stocks keeps on varying due to 
commencement of new firms and established firms going bankrupt or private.  
This research includes two types of empirical analyses to evaluate the performance of 
TVTR. A good performing risk estimator has to have significant effects on the returns going 
forward such that an increase in risk estimator should result in increase in forthcoming returns. 
After estimating TVTR using common stocks listed on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), I evaluated 
its performance cross-sectionally and overall. The factors data used in cross-sectional analysis 
downloaded from Bernt Arne Ødegaard’s webpage6 though the monthly risk free rate factor7 
fetched from the TITLON. The cross-sectional analysis conducted using data sample from 
January 1990 to December 2011 due to the non-availability of factors data of Norwegian market 
after 2011. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.0 illustrates the realized monthly OBX log returns distribution. The left 
skewness is clearly visible from the graph. The occurrence of extreme negative event is more 
probable than that of extreme positive event. 
                                                 
6
 Factors data is available at https://www1.uis.no/ansatt/odegaard/financial_data/ose_asset_pricing_data/index.html  
7
 The monthly risk free rate factor was calculated using the variable “bills_DayLnrate” in the TITLON macro 
enabled excel sheet “Stocks Advanced” 
Figure-4.0: An illustration of monthly OBX log returns distribution 
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Chapter – 4 
4.1 Discussion & Analyses 
 This part of the paper critically investigates the time varying extreme events risk of 
Norwegian market and its estimator TVTR. Moreover the effects of this risk estimator gauged on 
the returns of OSEBX. Further the performance of TVTR will be evaluated on the portfolios 
constructed based on the loadings of past tail risk. This section also discusses biases related to 
the specified analyses. This study is a two pronged empirical study. First, it uncovers the extreme 
events’ risk of Norwegian market in the form of TVTR. Second, it critically analyzes TVTR 
implications on the Norwegian stock market returns. This study is significantly imperative for 
equity investors owing to the high persistence level of this estimator. TVTR produces significant 
results cross-sectionally in value-weighted quintile portfolio setting controlling for Fama-French 
three factors, Fama-French-Carhart four-factor momentum model, as well as with respect to the 
Fama-French-Carhart model plus the liquidity factor of OSE made available on Bernt Arne 
Ødegaard’s webpage as a fifth control. 
4.1.1 TVTR Estimator 
 There are various fundamentally different estimators to measure extreme events risk such 
as risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis calculated using option price data introduced by Bakshi et 
al (2003), Balcus et al (2011) explained disaster risk premia using index option data. The 
aforementioned estimators are based on options data though Jiang and Kelly (2014) time-varying 
tail risk estimator is based on daily return data. The potency of TVTR depends upon the key 
underlying assumption that the tail risks of individual stocks share similar dynamics. Under such 
assumption, if the sample is sufficiently large, plentiful number of stocks will experience tail 
events every period which will result in a precise estimate of the prevailing tail risk.  
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The number of common stocks listed on OSE
8
 is very few to fundamentally test the 
underlying assumption of TVTR. Ideally, TVTR should be calculated using categorically 
different industries to examine the underlying assumption. The stock prices in the same industry 
usually co-move and have interdependence and this dependence implicitly exaggerates the 
commonality among TVTR estimates. Dividing the firms into different industry categories 
leaves very little number of companies in industries’ categories that present another estimation 
challenge as it causes too noisy estimates. I created two sets of stocks randomly from the total 
listed common stocks to overcome the interdependence issue arose during evaluating the 
underlying assumptions of TVTR.  
I estimated TVTR from these two sets of data separately to check whether the assumption 
hold true. I tested the assumption that tail events are governed by the same process using 
Spearman’s Rho. There is a clear rationale behind using Spearman correlation other than the 
widely used Pearson correlation. Pearson correlation based on the assumption that the comparing 
variables are normally distributed on the other hand Spearman correlation does not presume 
normality of tested variables
9
. The snapshot of results from R is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The total number common stocks listed on OSE were just 194 in the last month of year 2015.  
9
 First I ran the Shapiro–Wilk normality tests to check the distribution of the two TVTR series calculated from 
separate randomly selected securities. Both the series failed to conform normality, Snapshot of Shapiro–Wilk 
normality tests results of Set-1 TVTR and Set-2 TVTR are pasted in appendix – Figure A1.  
Figure-4.1: R result of Spearman Correlation between two randomly selected set of 
securities 
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 It is clear from the Figure 4.1 that the two series of TVTR are significantly related. The 
extremely low p-value suggests that we strongly reject the null hypothesis of no relation between 
the two TVTR series. The two TVTR series are approximately 48% correlated which gives 
validation to the underlying assumption of TVTR in the Norwegian context. This result is 
consistent with the US data results of Jiang & Kelly (2014). 
 It is evident from various threads of literature that the risk fluctuates time to time of an 
investment and risk estimators such as standard deviation, Value-at-Risk are time invariant 
(Gregory and Reeves 2008). TVTR is calculated month by month using daily log returns of all 
common securities with no overlapping of data which leaves us with no mechanical persistence. 
Yet, TVTR shows high level of persistence with monthly AR(1) coefficient equals to 0.673. 
Though, TVTR persistence level in Norwegian market is not as high as in the US market (AR(1) 
Coefficient equals to 0.927) calculated by Jiang and Kelly (2014). This high level of persistence 
means TVTR can be a good predictor of individual stock returns even in Norwegian market. 
 Figure-4.2: This graph shows the persistence level of TVTR series calculated each month by pooling daily log 
returns of all common stocks listed on OSE from 1990 to 2015. 
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 Figure 4.2 undoubtedly demonstrates that TVTR series is weakly stationary and 
persistent. The effect of a shock vanishes away gradually.  This means every next month 
estimate of TVTR is dependent on its lag so TVTR can be used as a predictor. The effect of the 
tail risk shock completely vanishes after 23 to 24 lags. 
4.1.2 TVTR & Aggregate Market Return 
 The performance of TVTR in forecasting returns is based on the power law. In simple 
words, the events of the left tail or Pareto distribution of the assets return contain the information 
to describe forthcoming aggregate return distribution. An extensive research has been conducted 
by various renowned finance scholars on the prediction power of Pareto exponents, for example 
Gabaix et al (2006), Akgiray and Booth (1988), Fama (1963), Mandelbrot (1963). TVTR (λ) is 
also a Pareto exponent. 
 I estimated this Pareto exponent – TVTR (λ) using all common stocks listed on OSE. A 
large cross-section is crucial for this parameter to be accurate. There are two main empirical 
challenges arise that question the robustness of TVTR estimate; dependence among assets’ 
returns and heterogeneity in volatility. Jiang and Kelly (2014) already answered these issues by 
performing Monte Carlo analysis in the presence of both issues
10
. 
 I test the hypothesis that TVTR predicts aggregate market returns by running series of 
OLS regressions. All the regressions are conducted on the monthly frequency of TVTR against 
OBX return. These results are comparable with the results of Jiang & Kelly (2014) due to same 
methodology. The statistical results of TVTR predictions of aggregate market returns are 
significantly different in the both markets; US & Norwegian. In contrary with Jiang & Kelly 
(2014) results the tail risk exponent failed to predict OBX returns as a proxy for aggregate 
market returns. Table 2 presents the results of the monthly OLS regressions of OBX returns 
                                                 
10
 . The issues become more crucial in this research due to very less number of stocks in Norwegian market as 
compared to US market. To examine the robustness and to increase the size of cross-section I calculated TVTR 
series using all kind of equity securities and find extremely similar results. The correlation coefficient between both 
TVTR series is 96 percent. 
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against TVTR over the time period of one month, one year, three years and five years. The 
monthly observations used in these regressions are overlapping therefore Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors correction model used to calculate t-stats
11
. The t-stats were calculated by 
applying the lag length equal to the number of months over the prediction time period. 
  Prediction Time Period 
Norwegian Market 
(              ) 
US Market 
(               ) 
Coeff.
12
 t-stat    Coeff. t-stat    
Over the period of one month 6.63 1.37 0.73 4.54 2.08 0.7 
Over the period of one year 4.05 0.81 0.28 4.02 2.04 6.1 
Over the period of three years 3.08 0.59 0.16 3.65 2.40 16.6 
Over the period of five years -6.20 -1.29 0.66 3.16 2.65 20.9 
Table 2 – The table shows univariate TVTR prediction performance of aggregate market returns.      stands for excess 
return over risk free rate on Oslo benchmark index,     stands for TVTR series calculated using daily log returns of all 
common stocks listed on OSE. US market results are presented from the Jiang & Kelly (2014). All R-Squared values are 
presented in percentage form. 
 I scaled the series in a manner that results can be stated in a form that the percentage 
increase in the following OBX returns due to one standard deviation increase in tail risk. 
Accordingly, the first row of table 2 left section presents Norwegian market results, a one 
standard deviation increase in left tail risk predicts an increase in future excess return over risk 
                                                 
11
 Jiang and Kelly (2014) used Hodrick’s (1992) standard error correction model to calculate t-stats which produces 
more conservative t-stats than Newey-West (1987) standard error correction model. The hypothesis, TVTR predicts 
OBX returns strongly rejected by Newey-West model subsequently Hodrick’s model would reject the hypothesis 
even more strongly. 
12
 All the coefficients are annualized to make them comparable with Jiang & Kelly (2014) results. 
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free rate of 6.63 percent per annum over the period of one month. But the low values of t-stats 
and R-Squared compel us to reject this claim. In the US market tail risk strongly predicts future 
returns and its performance becomes stronger long horizons as the t-stats and R-squared values 
increase with the prediction horizon. Contrarily, in the Norwegian market, the same estimator 
failed to forecast future excess returns and even its performance keeps on weakening with the 
expansion of the horizon. In the last row of Norwegian market results the prediction effect 
becomes negative in a sense that an increase in the tail risk parameter predicts a decrease in 
future returns over the horizon of five years.  
 The predictive regression over the horizon of one month yields the highest statistical 
results among all horizons forecasting results. It produces approximately the same R-Squared 
value in comparison of US market results. This R-squared value described as 0.7 percent 
variation in next month’s OBX returns is explained by the TVTR estimator. However, the t-stat 
is very low, just 1.37, in comparison with US 2.08. The main statistic used to reject a hypothesis 
is t-stat that is very low. Therefore TVTR estimator fails to forecast OBX returns over the 
horizon of one month. 
 The same type of predictive regression is conducted however, over the horizon of next 
year. Strangely, the results took a swift from the US market results. TVTR prediction 
performance decreased when the regression is performed over the horizon of one year while it 
increased in the US market. The portion of OBX returns variation explained by TVTR decreased 
to 0.28 percent. It further decreased to 0.16 percent when predictive regression performed on 
OBX returns against TVTR over the horizon of three years. 
 The predictive regression, performed on OBX returns against TVTR over the horizon of 
five years, produces entirely opposing results from the hypothesis that increase in TVTR leads to 
increased aggregate expected returns. The coefficient becomes negative which means that an 
increase in tail risk forecasts a decrease in the Norwegian aggregate market returns over the next 
five years. This last row regression results give a feeling of cyclical behavior of Norwegian 
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Figure-4.3: This graph shows the partial autocorrelation of monthly TVTR series calculated by 
pooling daily log returns of all common stocks listed on OSE from 1990 to 2015. 
equity market alias Oslo benchmark index
13
. Data noisiness
14
 can also be one of the reasons for 
this behavior, or the strong commonality with the oil price might be another explanation. 
Actually the effect of TVTR estimator on OBX returns over the horizon of five years is in 
line with the auto correlation results. The monthly AR (1) coefficient of tail risk series is lower in 
Norwegian market than that of US market. It means that the effect of left tail risk shock dies out 
in a shorter time span in Norway than that of US.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.3 presents the partial auto correlation factor of monthly tail risk series. The 
partial auto correlation graph helps us more precisely in understanding about how the risk shock’ 
effect vanishes. It can be said by looking at the graph that effect of a tail risk shock starts 
                                                 
13
 The graphs of seasonal, random and trend behavior of monthly tail risk and OBX log returns time series are 
presented in appendix, figures A2 and A3.  
14
 The cross-section I used for the analysis is from 1990 to 2015. All the regressions are performed on the monthly 
observations which mean total 312 observations. The observations further decreased to 252 when predictive 
regressions conducted over the horizon of five years. The fewer observations lead to increase the TVTR series bias 
due to volatility heterogeneity among asset returns. 
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becoming negative in the end though not significant. The dotted line represents the significance 
level.  
 The figures 4.4a and 4.4b on the next page give a comparison of TVTR estimator 
performance in US and in Norway. It is clear from the figure 4.4b that TVTR
15
 does not have a 
significant impact on future returns of Oslo benchmark index. There is no clear pattern except for 
some short patches. OBX constructed of 25 most liquid stocks listed at OSE, this construction 
approach makes it utterly different from CRSP value weighted index, which might be the reason 
for the insignificant performance of TVTR in the Norwegian market. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 The OBX returns predictive analysis by TVTR is based on log returns due to the superior properties of log returns 
in such kind of analysis such as log normality, time additivity and approximate equality of simple and log returns in 
short horizons. I also estimated TVTR series based on simple returns and the results are extremely similar for 
example both TVTR series are 99 percent correlated and AR (1) coefficient of log returns based series is 0.672 and 
0.646. 
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Figure-4.4a: This graph shows monthly tail risk series, calculated using returns of all common NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
stocks, plotted against next 3 year returns of CRSP value weighted index. The graph fetched from Jiang & Kelly (2014) 
Figure-4.4b: This graph shows monthly tail risk series, calculated using returns of all common Oslo Børs stocks, 
plotted against next 3 year returns of Oslo Benchmark Index. Both the series scaled to zero mean and unit 
variance for comparison purpose. 
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4.1.3 TVTR Cross-Sectionally 
 The cross-sectional analysis conducted by following the same procedure specified in the 
article by Jiang & Kelly (2014) for comparison objectives. The number of stocks in the US 
market is plentiful in comparison with the Norwegian market, and the analysis can be affected by 
this. The analysis is based on the rationale that when left tail risk of a specific stock increases, 
investors discount the stock more that leads to low price of that particular stock and incremental 
expected return going forward.  
The rationale is, investors are downside risk averse and shun securities with high left-tail 
risk. The securities that have high predictive loadings of TVTR, being a valid estimator of left 
tail risk, will be discounted more sharply than the securities with low TVTR predictive loadings. 
Consequently, securities with high TVTR loadings will have comparatively lower prices, 
therefore higher expected returns in the forthcoming horizon. The rationale is strengthened by 
the empirical results of TVTR. TVTR series yields monthly AR (1) coefficient equals to 0.673 
with the 95% confidence interval of 0.59 to 0.75. This means that the TVTR estimator has 
power to forecast returns of individual stock. 
The 312 monthly observations’ cross-section available for this analysis therefore only 
monthly out-of-sample analysis is conducted. The analysis is out of sample because there if no 
overlapping in the data used to calculate tail risk loading and data used to calculate realized 
returns. Quintile portfolios constructed based on the predictive beta coefficients and results 
gathered for a long position in highest tail risk loadings quintile portfolio and a short position in 
lowest highest tail risk loadings quintile portfolio. TVTR prediction performance of aggregate 
market returns was relatively better in the one month horizon therefore the monthly long/short 
portfolio analysis is the only one that makes sense. 
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The tail risk loadings of all OSE common stocks calculated by using the regression 
equation 4.1: 
                                                                      
      = Individual stock simple returns at time t+1 
  = Error Term 
  = Tail risk series estimates at time t 
  = Predictive tail loading of individual stock 
 Every month, the predictive regressions over the horizon of most recent 120 months 
conducted to estimate the tail risk loading of each stock. Stocks that have less than 36 
observations in past 120 months are excluded. Quintile portfolios are constructed every month 
based on the predictive tail risk loadings. Stocks priced less than 35 Norwegian Kroner or 5 
dollars
16
 omitted in the portfolio construction phase. Monthly average value weighted and 
equally weighted quintile portfolio formed. Quintile portfolios’ returns calculated based on one 
month holding period. The analysis rationale ordains that high tail risk sensitive quintile portfolio 
must earn significantly higher returns than that of low tail risk sensitive portfolio. Therefore, 
TVTR cross-section forecasting performance evaluated taking a long position in highest tail risk 
sensitive quintile portfolio and a short position in lowest tail risk sensitive quintile portfolio
17
.  
 TVTR cross-sectional forecasting performance analysis produced mixed results. Equally-
weighted high minus low tail risk quintile portfolio returns suggest no significant forecasting 
power of TVTR cross-sectionally. On the contrary, average monthly value-weighted high minus 
low tail risk quintile portfolio returns suggest significant forecasting power of TVTR cross-
sectionally. The results are also reported controlling for Fama-French three factors, Fama-
French-Carhart four-factor momentum model, as well as with respect to the Fama-French-
                                                 
16
 The exclusion is made to make the results comparable with Jiang and Kelly (2014). Stock prices are available in 
Norwegian Krone in the TITLON database. Dollars to NOKs conversion made using conversion rates from the US 
federal reserve bank website http://www.federalreserve.gov/  
17
 The cross-sectional analysis conducted using simple returns due to the analysis’ single time period nature. Simple 
returns are portfolio consistent though time inconsistent, log returns are portfolio inconsistent though time 
consistent. The analysis conducted on the data from 1990 to 2011 due to Norwegian market factors’ data non-
availability after 2011. 
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Carhart model plus the liquidity factor of OSE made available on Bernt Arne Ødegaard’s 
webpage as a fifth control. 
Equally-Weighted Portfolio High - Low  
(Annualized) Factor Low 2 3 4 High High-Low t-stat 
Average Return -0.39 0.10 0.70 0.43 0.27 0.65 1.10 8.12 
CAPM Alpha -0.81 -0.36 0.20 -0.08 -0.32 0.49 0.92 6.09 
FF Alpha -1.05 -0.45 0.21 -0.18 -0.36 0.69 1.30 8.61 
FF + Mom Alpha -1.09 -0.34 0.21 -0.19 -0.25 0.84 1.58 10.57 
FF + Mom + Liq Alpha -1.14 -0.36 0.19 -0.20 -0.30 0.84 1.56 10.53 
         
Value-Weighted Portfolio High - Low  
(Annualized) Factor Low 2 3 4 High High-Low t-stat 
Average Return -0.56 0.81 0.92 -0.05 1.24 1.80* 2.01* 23.89* 
CAPM Alpha -1.11 0.26 0.33 -0.62 0.60 1.71 1.92 22.59 
FF Alpha -1.42 0.24 0.44 -0.72 0.53 1.95* 2.18* 26.07* 
FF + Mom Alpha -1.46 0.25 0.59 -0.75 0.57 2.03* 2.24* 27.26* 
FF + Mom + Liq Alpha -1.55 0.28 0.63 -0.76 0.52 2.06* 2.26* 27.77* 
Table 318 – The table exhibits monthly statistics for the quintile portfolios constructed on the basis of predictive tail risk 
loading – Beta coefficients, except for the right most column which presents highest minus lowest tail risk sensitive zero 
investment quintile portfolio annualized returns and alphas. The table also presents quintile portfolio alphas from 
contemporaneous OLS regressions of portfolio returns against Fama-French three factors, Fama-French plus Carhart 
momentum four-factors and the extended five factors with fifth factor of OSE liquidity. (*) Asterisk represents 
statistically significant results. 
 The upside and downside portions of table 3 reveals equally-weighted and average 
monthly value-weighted quintile portfolio results respectively. The first row shows the average 
                                                 
18
 The analysis performed using all common stocks’ records, however, there are five companies that have 
inconsistent records in the TITLON database so those companies’ stocks were omitted while performing the 
analysis. The five companies are “Simrad Optronics”, “BW Gas”, “Bergesen d.y ser. A”, “Tsakos Energy 
Navigation” and “Sydvaranger”. 
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Table 3A: The table shows the results from the cross-sectional analysis conducted using US data by Jiang and Kelly 
(2014) 
returns of the quintile portfolios. First column presents the monthly average returns and alphas of 
lowest TVTR sensitive quintile portfolio. Accordingly, the fifth column presents the monthly 
average returns and alphas of lowest TVTR sensitive quintile portfolio. The sixth (High-Low) 
column displays the highest-minus-lowest tail risk portfolio returns and alphas and the seventh 
column presents their associated t statistic values. The last column shows the annualized results 
of sixth column. 
 
 Table 3A displays the same cross-sectional analysis results of US data by Jiang and Kelly 
(2014) for comparison objectives. The portfolio returns in the table 3 did not show any consistent 
downward trend of the form present in US data analysis in table 3A, such as returns decrease on 
the way from highest to lowest tail risk quintile portfolio. 
 Table 3 reveals that the highest tail risk equally-weighted portfolio did not report highest 
average return among the five portfolios. Unexpectedly, the third equally-weighted portfolio 
reported the highest results among the five. Though the lowest tail risk portfolio reports the least 
returns which is according to the rationale. All equally weighted portfolio results are statistically 
insignificant, produced too low t-stats. 
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 Converse to equally weighted portfolio results, average monthly value-weighted 
portfolios results are aligned with underlined rationale that TVTR being a valid estimator of tail 
risk, high tail risk portfolio reaps more returns in the future than that of low tail risk portfolio. 
The first row of value weighted portfolio in table 3 shows that average historical returns are 
highest – 1.24 percent monthly 15.94 percent annualized – for the highest TVTR sensitive value 
weighted portfolio. The monotonic trend also seems to appear that portfolio returns increase as 
the tail risk sensitivity increases except for the fourth quintile portfolio.  
The highest tail risk value-weighted portfolio earned annualized average return 23.89 
percent more than the lowest tail risk value weighted portfolio, with the t-statistic of 2.01 and p-
value of 0.046.  The return (23.9%) is much higher than that of US market (4.4% annualized – 
0.36% monthly). This result makes some intuitive sense because the volatility spread of 
Norwegian market is much higher than the US market. 
 The second row of value weighted portfolio in table 3 displays the alphas of regressions 
of portfolio returns against market returns. The results are also consistent with the rationale of 
cross-sectional analysis but are not statistically significant. The high-minus-low tail risk value 
weighted portfolio CAPM alpha reports a t-stat 1.92 with p-value 0.0563. The p-value is slightly 
over the significance level. 
 The third row of value weighted portfolio in table 3 displays the alphas of regressions of 
portfolio returns against Fama-French three factors; market factor, small minus big market 
capitalization firms’ stock factor and high minus low book to market value factor. The high 
minus low three factor annualized alpha is 26.07% with a significant t-statistic 2.18. Similarly in 
table 3, the fourth row of value weighted portfolio presents four-factor alphas calculated by 
multivariate regressions. The alphas are robust controlling for Fama-Frech three factors in 
addition to Carhart momentum factor. High minus low tail risk portfolio alpha is 27.26% 
annualized (t-stat= 2.24). The alphas of the five factor regressions – the aforementioned four 
factors plus a liquidity factor of OSE – demonstrate similar statistically significant results. 
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 The three factor alpha results mean that if an investor takes a long position in highest 
TVTR sensitive value-weighted portfolio and a short position in lowest TVTR sensitive value-
weighted portfolio, he shall earn 26 percent extra returns controlling for OBX returns, small 
minus big value firms’ returns and high minus low book to market value firms’ returns. This 
result has implications for assets pricing. 
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4.1.3.1  Data Bias 
 The cross-sectional analysis performed accessing data from various data sources though 
the main source is the TITLON database. The analysis performed using all common stocks listed 
on OSE. The common stocks’ count is very low in Norwegian market which leads to significant 
changes in return results of quintile portfolios. Such as a single asset extreme event impacts the 
whole portfolio returns significantly. This sample noisiness increases the returns volatility spread 
of quintile portfolio returns. Most recent 120 months data used to calculate each stock predictive 
tail risk loadings which left us with 143 monthly observations to examine TVTR quintile 
portfolios returns controlling for the five specified returns factors because Norwegian factors’ 
data is available until 2011. 
Another potential bias arises due to non-availability of stocks’ delisting information. The 
TITLON database does not provide any tag or description about the stocks delisted from Oslo 
stock exchange. TITLON does not provide information about the delisted stock that whether the 
issuing firm went bankrupt or the firm went private. This left us with three choices to make. 
First, the choice to omit stocks whose data stopped appearing in TITLON. But it creates survival 
bias which is very crucial in the context of tail risk. Second, the choice to consider that all stocks 
whose data stopped appearing in TITLON went private. But this choice results in upward biased 
estimates. The third choice is to consider all stocks whose data stopped appearing in TITLON 
went bankrupt. But this choice results in underestimation of portfolio returns. 
Owing to the nature of cross-sectional analysis the third choice was made to perform the 
analysis. The assumption produces downward biased estimates of TVTR quintile portfolio 
returns. The numbers of bankruptcies, observed in each TVTR quintile portfolio, are presented in 
table 4 below.  
Tail Risk Portfolio Low 2 3 4 High 
Number of Bankruptcies Observed 20 16 9 9 13 
Table 4 – The table reports number of bankruptcies observed in each tail risk quintile portfolio 
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4.1.4  Look-Ahead Bias 
 The look-ahead bias can be defined as the bias arises due to the use of historical data in 
back-testing a strategy – investment strategy in our context – that would not have been known at 
the time period being analyzed. Daniel et al (2009) argued that back-testing the performance of 
an investment strategy seems really straightforward but it contains various ex-post conditioning 
biases such as survival bias, the look-ahead bias and data-snooping. The survival bias is 
unconcerned from this both analyses because TITLON contains data of solvent companies as 
well as the companies that went private later on. They stated that the look-ahead bias can lead to 
over estimation of expected returns up to 8 percent per annum. Data snooping bias is also 
negligible in the performed analyses which refers to the bias arise when statistical inference is 
made after analyzing the data without any pre-planned inference making arrangement. 
 There is valid reasoning to accept the existence of look-ahead bias in the cross-sectional 
analysis. Because returns are calculated using adjusted prices that contain dividends and other 
corporate events effects. Dividend payout and other corporate events occur with some time gaps 
but their effects are apportioned to daily stock prices.  It is very strenuous to evade look-ahead 
bias in back-testing investment strategy performance analyses by simulation. But one cannot be 
absolutely certain that the bias has been removed. 
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Chapter – 5 
5.1 Conclusion 
 Time varying tail risk estimator based on Hill’s (1975) power law was introduced by 
Jiang and Kelly (2014). The empirical results were very significant in their research article. It is 
not necessary that every country’ equity market behaves similarly. There are numerous variables 
that cause rise and fall of asset prices. It is not only fundamentals that cause price movements, 
investors’ beliefs and understanding plays a vital role in that.  
 The empirical finds in the table 2 concludes that tail risk estimated using Hill’s (1975) 
power law exponent failed in forecasting Oslo benchmark index returns over the horizon of one 
month, one year, three years and five years contrary to Jiang and Kelly (2014) empirical 
findings. Though consistent with Jiang and Kelly (2014) findings the estimator showed 
significant persistence level with statistically significant monthly AR (1) coefficient. 
The cross-sectional analysis performed to test prediction power of TVTR for individual 
asset returns produced mixed results. Equally weighted TVTR sensitive quintile portfolio returns 
analysis results presented in the table 3 reject the notion that TVTR predicts expected returns 
cross-sectionally. On the contrary average monthly value-weighted TVTR sensitive quintile 
portfolio returns analysis results presented in the table 3 fail to reject the idea that TVTR is a 
contender of significant expected returns. A long high tail risk and short low tail risk net 
investment portfolio results are significant with significant t-statistics except for CAPM alpha. 
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5.2 Further Research  
The dynamics of Oslo benchmark index are very different from CRSP value weighted 
index. Oslo benchmark index constructed of just 25 most liquid stocks listed at Oslo Stock 
Exchange. The low number of stocks on Oslo stock exchange implies that a different sampling 
approach should be considered to calculate Hill’s (1975) power law exponent. Because all 
analyses produced results in the same direction the rationale – higher the risk greater the 
expected returns – ordains but statistically insignificant. The above mentioned data bias creates 
problems in back-testing portfolio investment strategy. Delisted stocks information will make 
these kinds of analyses robust.  
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Figure-A1: Snapshot of R result of Shapiro–Wilk normality tests of two TVTR series 
calculated from two randomly selected set of securities 
Figure-A2: The figure presents the decomposition of monthly TVTR time series 
Appendix 
Figure A1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2 
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Figure-A3: The figure presents the decomposition of monthly OBX log returns time series 
Figure A3 
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Table A1 
 
Sr. No. Description 
1 A-aksjer 
2 B-aksjer 
3 Exchange tradeable fund 
4 Frie aksjer 
5 Grunnfondsbevis 
6 Konverterte A 
7 Konverterte aksjer 
8 Konverterte B 
9 Konverterte F 
10 Nye aksjer 
11 Nye B 
12 Ordinære aksjer 
13 Preferanseaksjer 
14 NULL
19
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 There are only three companies “Ugland International”, ”Skandia” and “Burmeister & Wain Holding B”  with no 
description of their stocks 
Table A1 – The table presents the full list of stock types (Description) available in the TITLON database. 
